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A Pragmatic-Ontic Account of Mechanistic Explanation 
 
Craver‟s (2007) account of explanation in neurobiology offers one of the 
most sophisticated explications of the mechanism concept. This paper 
argues that despite groundbreaking advances in understanding 
mechanistic explanation, serious challenges remain. The first goal of this 
paper is to address the notorious problem of explanatory relevance 
concerning mechanistic explanation. I argue that Craver underestimates 
the importance of pragmatic constraints on the individuation of 
mechanisms, and that his suggestion for a solution of the explanatory 
relevance problem is therefore insufficient on several counts. My second 
goal is to develop an alternative that explicitly incorporates both 
pragmatic and ontic aspects of mechanism individuation.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Although (Bechtel and Richardson 1993) and (Glennan 1996) re-awakened 
the concept of a mechanism in contemporary discussions of explanation from a 
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slumber of about ten years,1 the new mechanism debates were largely initiated by 
(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000) (hereafter, MDC).2 MDC claim that 
mechanisms are sought to explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some 
significant process works. They define mechanisms as “entities and activities 
organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to 
finish or termination conditions” (MDC, 3).3 They believe that thinking in terms of 
mechanisms provides a new framework for addressing many traditional philosophical 
issues such as “causality, laws, explanation, reduction, and scientific change” (2000, 
1). This is the „Mechanista Manifesto‟ that has motivated a remarkable surge in 
publications on this topic.4 The vast majority of the articles discussing MDC are either 
attempts to develop their account further, or attempts to apply the very same concept 
of mechanism to different disciplines and to different philosophical issues. The 
mechanistic view has been extended to disciplines ranging from computer science 
through chemistry to sociology (see e.g. (Piccinini 2007), (Thagard 2003), (Mayntz 
2004), respectively); and to philosophical issues including reductionism, feminism 
                                                 
1 The concept had its last prominent appearances in Wimsatt (1976), Railton (1980), 
and Salmon (1984). 
2 MDC is now the most cited paper in Philosophy of Science according to its own 
website. 
3 Machamer claims in a later paper that „regular‟ should be dropped from the 
definition (Machamer 2004, 37) agreeing with Jim Bogen‟s arguments that there 
might be mechanisms that operate only sporadically, or even just once (published 
later in (Bogen 2005). 
4 I thank Ken Waters for introducing me to this slightly funny, but spot on, name for 
the fervent supporters of this position. 
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and objectivity (e.g. (Delehanty 2005), (Fehr 2004), (Thagard 2008), respectively). By 
contrast, there have been relatively few attempts to examine critically the account 
itself, or its relation to more traditional accounts of explanation and causation.5 The 
aim of this paper is to do exactly that. I begin by examining a precursor to the recent 
mechanism movement, the causal-mechanical account of explanation, in order to 
introduce a critical distinction that accounts of explanation should address (especially 
if they are ontic). The distinction is between ideal, infinite vs. pragmatic, partial 
descriptions of the explanans. This points to a traditional challenge that any account 
of explanation must tackle: the problem of explanatory relevance (Section Two). The 
traditional problem of explanatory relevance for the deductive-nomological account 
concerns the inclusion criteria for the premises of an explanation in order for them to 
be necessary and sufficient for the derivation of the explanandum. In Section Three, I 
illustrate how this problem finds its counterpart in mechanistic explanation. The 
description of the mechanism, whether it is ideal or partial, should include those and 
only those entities and causal interactions that are explanatory of the explanandum 
phenomenon. I argue that only a pragmatic account of mechanistic explanations can 
deliver a satisfactory solution for this problem. An ideal description would be 
extremely redundant and so complex that it cannot be a viable characterization of 
explanation in science. Section Four takes a closer look at Craver‟s account of 
explanandum phenomena. I show that he vacillates between ideal and pragmatic 
notions of explanation resulting in an inconsistent account. In Section Five, I 
challenge Craver‟s own take on the explanatory relevance criteria (for constitutive 
explanation), called „mutual manipulability‟, which will turn out to be insufficient on 
several counts. In Section Six, drawing on van Fraassen‟s pragmatic theory of 
                                                 
5 Notable exceptions are (Weber 2008) and (Psillos 2004). 
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explanation and the Woodward/Craver criteria of manipulability, I suggest an 
alternative account of mechanistic explanation that, together with a causal-
mechanical determinant of the relevance relation, explicitly incorporates the 
unavoidable pragmatic constraints on the individuation of mechanisms. I illustrate this 
in Section Seven with an example from molecular biology, the mechanism of 
transcription. I conclude by arguing that mechanisms are not “acting entities” or even 
kinds of things; as every appropriately posed question seeking a mechanistic 
explanation will lead to an answer that includes a description of a different 
mechanism. Thus, Mechanisms are best thought of as any set of entities and causal 
interactions that are referred to in such an explanation.6  
 
2. Back to the roots: The ideal-pragmatic distinction in ontic explanations 
Both Peter Railton and (post-1984) Wesley Salmon promoted a causal-mechanical 
view of explanation. They both suggest that to explain something is to show how the 
explanandum fits into the causal nexus of the world. This causal nexus is the ontic 
basis for explanation, as it constitutes what there is in the world. It is composed of 
myriads of causal processes and causal interactions. To explain is to show how a 
phenomenon fits into this nexus by describing the processes and interactions that 
lead to that phenomenon.7 The concept of „mechanism‟ plays a relatively minor role 
in both Salmon and Railton‟s accounts. Railton claims that he does  
                                                 
6 The question how mechanistic questions are posed appropriately is of course part 
and parcel of a pragmatic-ontic account of mechanistic explanation. 
7 Railton‟s account differs from Salmon's in a number of significant respects, and it 
can be argued that Salmon distorted Railton‟s opus magnum „Explaining Explanation‟ 
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not have anything very definite to say about what would count as 
„elucidating the mechanisms at work‟ - probabilistic or otherwise - but it 
seems clear enough that an account of scientific explanation seeking 
fidelity to scientific explanatory practice should recognize that part of 
scientific ideals of explanation and understanding is a description of the 
mechanisms at work, where this includes, but is not merely, an 
invocation of the relevant laws (Railton 1978, 242).  
Salmon only states that “Causal processes, causal interactions, and causal 
laws provide the mechanisms by which the world works; to understand why certain 
things happen, we need to see how they are produced by these mechanisms” 
(Salmon 1984, 132). Neither are interested in an elaborate explication of the concept 
of a mechanism but rather of mechanistic explanation, and I suspect that the 
problems I will address may have been a (tacit) reason to steer away from this 
quagmire. 
Nevertheless, a distinction Railton introduced will be helpful in pinpointing the 
problems with Craver‟s (2007) account and its difference to the pragmatic-ontic 
alternative that I develop. Railton distinguished two basically different conceptions of 
explanation: ideal and salient explanations. An ideal explanatory text is a potentially 
infinite text that includes all possible explanations of a phenomenon, including 
causal, reductive, etiological (i.e. the entire causal history of an event) and structural 
explanations, on all possible descriptive levels (microphysical, phenomenological, 
etc.). By contrast, partial explanatory information includes only those salient parts of 
the ideal explanatory text that are necessary for answering a specific why-question. 
                                                                                                                                                        
by suggesting that there are more similarities with his own account than there really 
are. 
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Whereas an ideal explanatory text should include all objective, causally relevant 
information, partial explanatory information is a pragmatic notion that includes all the 
relevant information in a given explanatory context. Here is how Railton characterizes 
ideal explanatory texts: 
An ideal text for the explanation of the outcome of a causal process 
would look something like this: an inter-connected series of law-based 
accounts of all the nodes and links in the causal network culminating in 
the explanandum, complete with a fully detailed description of the causal 
mechanisms involved and theoretical derivations of all the covering laws 
involved. This full-blown causal account would extend, via various 
relations of reduction and supervenience, to all levels of analysis, i.e., 
the ideal text would be closed under relations of causal dependence, 
reduction, and supervenience. It would be the whole story concerning 
why the explanandum occurred, relative to a correct theory of the lawful 
dependencies of the world. Such an ideal causal D-N text would be 
infinite if time were without beginning or infinitely divisible, and plainly 
there is no question of ever setting such an ideal text down on paper. 
(Indeed, if time is continuous, an ideal causal text might have to be non-
denumerably infinite — and thus “ideal” in a very strong sense.) But it is 
clear that a whole range of less-than-ideal proffered explanations could 
more or less successfully convey information about such an ideal text 
and so be more or less successful explanations, even if not in D-N form 
(Railton 1978, 247). 
 
This kind of “fully detailed description of the causal mechanisms”, as a part of an 
ideal explanatory text, would be an infinite and ideal account. It would include all the 
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causal events in the past light cone of the explanandum with an ideally 
(infinitesimally) fine-grained description of the properties, entities and causal 
interactions. Moreover, it would include a multitude of descriptions on different levels 
“relative to a correct theory of the lawful dependencies of the world”. It seems 
obvious that such a concept of a mechanism or of the conditions of inclusion in such 
a mechanism description is not what scientists mean when they talk about 
mechanisms. Moreover, such a strongly idealized concept of a mechanism is helpful 
neither for understanding the roles mechanisms play in the heuristics of discovery 
(see e.g. (Darden 2006)), nor in the integration of results from different fields of 
research. Scientists are interested in only a part of this ideal text.8 They are 
interested in what Railton calls partial explanatory information. However, selecting 
just some part of text as explanatorily relevant from the ideal explanatory text is 
intrinsically a pragmatic choice as it is based on salience conditions. Thus, if the 
description of a mechanism is the product of pragmatic considerations, the referent of 
this description (i.e. the mechanism) does not exist as a mechanism independently of 
scientists querying for it. It only exists as a mechanism in relation to some particular 
why-question that makes it explanatorily relevant for us.  
                                                 
8 As both (Darden 2006) and (Craver 2007) show, the heuristic and integrative role of 
mechanisms is very focused. A missing entity or activity (a black box) in a 
mechanistic sketch is a starting point for research, and the links between different 
areas of research are integrated in a mosaic by fitting single entities in different 
mechanisms described by different means. Mechanism descriptions, as published in 
scientific articles, are always addressing a particular aspect of the explanandum 
phenomenon.  
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This is a conclusion that Craver would like to avoid. For Craver, mechanisms 
are “objective explanations”, which are “full-bodied things” and a good and complete 
description of such a mechanism represents all of it (Craver 2007, 27). Moreover, 
“the boundaries of mechanisms — what is in the mechanism and what is not—are 
fixed by reference to the phenomenon that the mechanism explains” (2007, 123). I 
will argue that this concept of mechanism is untenable not least due to its undesirable 
ontological consequences. It leads to an over-population of the ontological zoo. 
There would be as many different mechanisms as there are interesting ways to 
answer why-questions with mechanistic explanations. Moreover, our choices about 
which why-questions to answer with which mechanistic explanations would determine 
what really exists. At times, Craver appears to be aware of these unwelcome 
ontological consequences, but he tries to have it both ways: mechanism descriptions 
as ideal explanatory texts and as partial explanatory information. As we shall see, by 
equivocating on the issue, Craver falls prey to one of the most notorious problems in 
the philosophy of explanation: the problem of explanatory relevance. 
3. The newest incarnations of the explanatory relevance problem 
The challenge is to answer the question: what conditions must the premises or 
parts of an explanation satisfy so that only those relevant to the explanation are 
included in the explanans. Every account of explanation must provide a solution to 
this problem.9 I would even maintain that it is the touchstone of any account, because 
                                                 
9 Craver argues that “complete explanatory texts are complete because they 
represent all and only the relevant portions of the causal structure of the world” and 
“Explanatory texts can be accurate enough and complete enough, depending on the 
pragmatic context in which the explanation is requested and given. Objective 
explanations [i.e. mechanisms] are not variable in this way” (2007, 27). However, as I 
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if these conditions cannot be satisfactorily stated, the account is incomplete and 
cannot be fruitfully applied.  
Arguably, the problem of explanatory relevance brought most traditional 
accounts to their knees. Many counterexamples to the deductive-nomological and 
inductive-statistical models of explanation (e.g. the flagpole and the shadow 
(Bromberger 1966, 92ff.), the hexed salt dissolution (Kyburg 1965, 147), and the men 
and oral contraceptive example (Salmon 1971, 34)) aim to show that the conditions 
for the premises for Hempel and Oppenheim‟s deductive-nomological model of 
explanation are either too strong or too weak. In an ironic turn of events, Salmon‟s 
(1994) conserved quantity account has been challenged on the grounds that it 
cannot distinguish between processes that are explanatorily relevant and processes 
that take place at the same time but are not explanatory.10 The same problem arises 
for mechanistic accounts of explanation: How should we demarcate the boundaries 
of a mechanism? How does one determine what to include as part of a mechanism 
and what to exclude as irrelevant or unexplanatory? 
As Railton already argued, for complete etiological mechanisms, there is no 
end to the details that could be included in the past light cone of the explanandum 
event. A similar point applies to the mechanism descriptions that have a temporal 
boundary set by the explanandum phenomenon. These kinds of mechanisms, such 
as input-output mechanisms or constitutive mechanisms, include the starting point 
                                                                                                                                                        
argue, complete (i.e. ideal) explanatory texts are not descriptions of mechanisms as 
scientists understand them. Mechanisms in science are to what partial texts refer. I 
will emphasize this point in the following.  
10 See (Hitchcock 1995). Salmon has acknowledged that this is indeed a problem 
and re-introduced statistical relevance to his account (Salmon 1997). 
10 
 
and end point of the process to be described, so they are not potentially infinite in the 
same way that etiological mechanisms are (an ideal mechanism that tracks the 
history of an explanandum event has no natural starting point in time other than 
perhaps the big bang). However, an implication of Railton‟s argument is that even an 
ideal complete description of a time-limited mechanism is infinite as its time is 
“infinitely divisible”. Moreover, the multitude of levels and different degrees of 
precision of possible descriptions should add to the plausibility of the claim that 
complete mechanism descriptions are unattainable in practice, even if one is 
unconvinced by the argument to that conclusion based on the infinite divisibility of 
time.  
As Beatty (1997) has so poignantly argued, biologists usually do not seek to 
describe events that occur only once in nature.11 They aspire to discover 
mechanisms that are abundant. If we were aspiring at complete descriptions of the 
processes that bring about a certain phenomenon several times, either at different 
times or in different individuals, or even in different species, then the only way to 
attain such a completeness would be a disjunctive description, as for example, the 
paths of the ions in the neuron in the case of an action potential are different in any 
individual event. Consequently, each occurrence of the explanandum would add 
another infinite description. This cannot be the answer to anything interesting. So 
even an ideal explanatory text of a type of a phenomenon that has several tokens 
must somehow abstract from the details that are irrelevant to the explanation of the 
                                                 
11 There are of course some important exceptions to this, especially in evolutionary 
biology; most prominently, the description of the beginning of self-reproducing life 
forms is itself a major goal in pre-biotic evolutionary biology, where a satisfactory 
explanation of this singular event would be groundbreaking. 
11 
 
explanandum, and therefore may vary between different tokens of the explanandum 
without changing its identity as the same type of phenomenon. This kind of 
abstraction from variation that leaves the identity of the explanans processes and the 
explanandum phenomenon untouched (however this is determined) is a pre-
condition for generalization, i.e., for explanations of phenomena types that have more 
than one instance. It may be that an ideal explanatory text includes all the „rest‟, but it 
remains unclear how to determine what kind of details, properties, or entities will not 
end up in the infinite text that includes all true theories, laws, and concepts that might 
be used to explain the phenomenon. If we restrict the ideal text to mechanistic 
explanation, i.e. to an ideal mechanistic explanatory text, we could of course exclude 
non-mechanistic explanations, like structural or unificatory explanations. As argued 
above, the resulting text would still be infinite. However, it might still be sensible to 
ask whether it is possible to account for the conditions of inclusion in such a text. 
Thus, the ideal mechanistic explanatory text should refer only to those entities and 
causal interactions that are relevant for the explanandum phenomenon. I will call this 
the ideal mechanistic explanatory relevance problem (IMERP).  
Railton‟s partial explanatory information is an answer to a specific question 
about the explanandum phenomenon. The selection of this text from the ideal text is 
determined by the kind of question asked. Therefore, the relevance criteria for 
inclusion in the partial text are (implicitly) included in the question itself. Thus, partial 
mechanistic explanatory information is a text that refers to entities and causal 
interactions that should include only the text that is relevant for answering that 
specific question. This would be the partial mechanistic explanatory relevance 
problem (PMERP). Whereas IMERP asks for the proper relationship between the 
explanans and the explanandum phenomenon, PMERP asks for the proper 
relationship between the explanans and the question asked. In order to solve IMERP, 
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we need to explicate the notion of an explanandum phenomenon in a satisfactory 
manner, including e.g. the numerical identity criteria of a phenomenon (what 
constitutes just one phenomenon in contrast to two disparate phenomena), which as 
I will discuss below, is notoriously difficult. The solution to the PMERP does not need 
to delve into this quagmire. A proper characterization of questions (using basic 
erotetic logic and adding further determinants that I will explicate below) is a far 
easier undertaking that is free of the metaphysical burden tied to the concept of 
explanandum phenomena. Additionally, a partial text is finite and may be written 
down in publications and textbooks, something scientists really do, whereas ideal 
texts are only of concern in philosophical discussions. We will return to my proposed 
solution to PMERP in Section Six, first however, I would like to show why failing to 
distinguish between IMERP and PMERP leads to an incoherent account of 
mechanisms. In order to do so, I will further divide the relevance problems into two 
sub-problems. First, what are explanandum phenomena of mechanisms (IMERP) or 
mechanistic questions (PMERP), and second, according to what criteria are the 
entities and causal interactions that appear in the explanans to be selected (in both 
relevance problems)? I begin with Craver‟s account(s) of explanandum phenomena. 
 
4. Craver’s two concepts of a phenomenon 
The new mechanistic philosophers agree that there are no mechanisms 
simpliciter. Mechanisms are always mechanisms for a behavior or a phenomenon, 
and the description of a mechanism is an explanation of an explanandum 
phenomenon. Even so, Craver offers two incompatible explications of an 
explanandum phenomenon. According to one, “It is insufficient to characterize the 
[explanandum] phenomenon only under standard precipitating conditions. A 
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complete characterization of the phenomenon requires one to know…” [all the 
following:] “… its precipitating conditions, manifestations, inhibitory conditions, 
modulating conditions, nonstandard conditions, and byproducts” (Craver 2007, 126ff, 
my italics). Thus, according to Craver, a mechanism should account for all the 
aspects of the explanandum phenomenon (2007, 128). This characterization has two 
very distinctive features. First, it claims that there is such a thing as a complete 
characterization of a phenomenon (see also fn. 9). I will not belabor the point that 
there are infinitely many ways to describe a phenomenon. More importantly, Craver 
claims that a phenomenon is not just one state or one event, but it is a multitude of 
states or events. All kinds of events, even the absence of an event, are parts of the 
phenomenon. For example, inhibitions might result in no event at all. If the 
explanandum phenomenon is, e.g., the delivery of oxygen to the periphery of the 
organism, then no delivery of oxygen is also part of the phenomenon (given that the 
inhibition was causally connected to the entities that are causing delivery under other 
circumstances). Thus, Craver‟s first characterization is not of one process in time. 
Later in the book (Craver 2007, 202-211), Craver gives a very different 
characterization of the explanandum phenomenon; one that accords much better 
with other characterizations of a mechanism made by MDC (and Glennan). Craver 
claims that the explanandum phenomenon is to be identified contrastively: “The 
contrastive description of the explanandum effect is helpful … to identify precisely 
that feature of the world for which a cause is sought” (2007, 204). Craver alludes to 
Hitchcock‟s point that answering the question about whether smoking a pack a 
cigarettes per day causes lung cancer depends on the contrast to what happened 
before (was the person a non-smoker or even a heavier smoker before smoking a 
pack a day) (Hitchcock 1996). This, however, means that an explanandum 
phenomenon with a different contrast class is to be understood as a different 
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phenomenon. Thus, using Craver‟s notation, S for a system and Ψi for S‟s activity, 
S‟s Ψ1-ing in contrast to Ψ2-ing is a different phenomenon than S‟s Ψ1-ing in contrast 
to Ψ3-ing. Craver illustrates this point with the example of freezing water (2007, 
205ff.). If the temperature of a bucket of water at sea level drops to -18.6°C, one 
could ask both “what caused the water to freeze?” or “what caused the water to 
freeze in exactly t minutes (rather than faster or slower)?” For the first question, the 
relevant feature of -18.6°C is only that it is below 0°C. For the second question, it is 
relevant that it is -18.6°C and not, e.g., -15°C. So while the answer to the first 
question will only cite the property that the temperature fell under 0°C as causally 
relevant, the second answer will cite the exact temperature, as “[b]eing below 0°C, 
however, is relevant only to the fact that the water freezes, not to its rate of freezing. 
The values of the variable are too coarse to identify the relevant differences” (2007, 
206).  
This is where the clash between these two characterizations occurs. 
According to the first characterization, to describe a single phenomenon means to 
describe all of its modulating and inhibiting conditions, that is, to describe S‟s Ψ1-ing 
AND Ψ2-ing AND Ψ3-ing and to find a mechanism that explains all these behaviors, 
whereas according to the second explication, we would have two different 
explanandum phenomena (S‟s Ψ1-ing RATHER THAN Ψ2-ing AND S‟s Ψ1-ing 
RATHER THAN Ψ3) and two different mechanisms, accordingly. In the second case, 
a mechanism is used to answer a question of the sort „why X rather than Y?‟, which is 
a description of a mechanism as partial mechanistic explanatory information, as the 
context of the question is crucial for the selection of the causal processes selected to 
be included in the mechanism. The first case, by contrast, characterizes the 
mechanistic explanation as an ideal mechanistic explanatory text. To describe all the 
possible modulating conditions of a phenomenon is an infinite task. A single 
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continuous variable yields an infinite amount of values that should be described. As 
illustrated in the example of the bucket of freezing water, all temperatures and 
freezing times are part of this description. The mechanism that accounts for a 
phenomenon in this wide sense is extremely complex and abstract. We would have 
to include all kinds of conditionals into its description, as Craver wants us to include 
laboratory conditions. Experimental set-ups must also be included, and then these 
must be integrated into different kinds of in vivo systems, etc. It seems, however, that 
there is something deeply wrong about characterizing mechanisms in this wide 
sense. Although it is true that one discovers a mechanism by tinkering with it, i.e., by 
looking at its modulating conditions, inhibiting conditions, etc., identifying the 
experiments themselves as part of the mechanism or as part of the explanandum 
phenomenon seems awkward at best. For example, the inhibition of sodium channels 
by tetrodotoxin (TTX) is one way to understand the role of sodium channels in action 
potentials. However, the TTX/sodium channel causal interaction is not part of the 
generic action potential mechanism. The second characterization is much closer to 
the idea of mechanism as used by biologists, and to what Railton calls partial 
explanatory information. Such a characterization opens the door to a pragmatic 
solution to PMERP, which is the basis of the alternative account of mechanistic 
explanation that I offer.  
Craver stresses that his “account is thus no more pragmatic than any view of 
causation or explanation would have to be” (2007, 204). However, Craver overlooks 
a decisive difference between causal explanations (as construed by e.g. Woodward) 
and his account of mechanisms. The former does not imply that there is some kind of 
„fence‟ that demarcates the objects and causal interactions cited in the explanation. 
By contrast, the mechanism itself is supposed to have a distinct boundary, as Craver 
claims that mechanisms are “full-bodied things” and “acting entities”. If the 
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boundaries that demarcate such „things‟, and the objects it contains, are different for 
different questions and depend on how a particular why-question is asked, then we 
would have to accept a very messy ontology. In ordinary language, we often refer to 
arbitrary or even gerrymandered „things‟, like the tip of my finger or a spot on my 
screen. However, science seeks to avoid such a volatile clutter. It aspires at a lean, 
stable ontology, with as few entities as possible to explain it all. Accepting the 
abundance of mechanisms to the basic furniture of the world would run counter its 
purpose. 
However even if we settle for a concept of an explanandum phenomenon that 
is close to MDC, Glennan and Craver‟s contrastive explication (and abandon 
attempting to solve IMERP), we would still have to confront the second part of the 
explanatory relevance problem: the criteria for inclusion in an explanation.  
 
5. Mechanistic Explanatory Relevance Criteria 
Craver proposes a solution to the problem of explanatory relevance (for 
constitutive mechanisms). He proposes that the following mutual manipulability 
criteria (MM) are sufficient for constitutive relevance: 
 
(CR1) When [the entity‟s activity] Φ is set to the value φ1 in an ideal 
intervention, then [the system‟s activity] Ψ takes on the value of f(φ1).
12 
 
                                                 
12 Craver adds two further constraints to CR1 (CR1a & CR1b) in order to exclude 
compensatory responses (such as recovery, redundancy, and reorganization) 
(Craver 2007, 156ff.). I will assume these additional conditions as well, without further 
elaboration. 
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and 
 
(CR2) if [the system‟s activity] Ψ is set to the value ψ1 in an ideal intervention, 
then [the entity‟s activity] Φ takes on the value f(ψ1). 
 
Thus, according to Craver, in order for an entity and its activity φi to be included in 
the mechanism, it must change the system‟s activity ψi if manipulated, and it itself 
must change if the system‟s activity is manipulated. Craver contends that these 
conditions are sufficient for inclusion in a mechanism. I will argue that CR1 is 
necessary, but insufficient for inclusion, and that even adding CR2 does not make it 
sufficient.  
First, Craver‟s mutual manipulability criterion that determines whether a 
particular entity is to be included in the mechanism is incomplete because it does not 
specify the kinds of entities that should be included in the mechanism. It does not 
determine on what level of description the mechanism should take place. In 
(constitutive) mechanisms, we run into the problem that some entities, and parts of 
these entities, could be manipulated with the same result in the change of the 
system‟s activity. For example, manipulating a person‟s heart in a certain way will 
affect the person‟s behavior. However, manipulating the person‟s pacemaker cells 
(which are part of the heart) will also yield the same system activity, e.g. dying or 
anxiety (as an effect of tachycardia). Thus with Craver‟s manipulability criterion, we 
would be obliged to include the heart and the pacemaker cells as entities in the 
mechanism, and therefore include arguably redundant descriptions. In order to avoid 
this, a decision about the level of the mechanism description has to be made (or to 
put it differently, the kind of entities included have to be determined). Alternatively, we 
could allow for a two level mechanism. Either way, a decision has to be made, and it 
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is a pragmatic decision about the answer that we seek, when asking for an 
explanation of some phenomenon. Adding top-down conditions will not help, because 
manipulating the system‟s activity (e.g. from resting to running, calm to panic, etc.) 
will yield both the heart‟s pumping faster and the pacemaker cells generating more 
electric impulses per minute.  
Second, the MM criteria are not specific enough to determine the boundaries 
of the mechanism. Thus, for example, if the explanandum phenomenon is delivering 
4.5 liters of blood per minute to the organs in a human being, rather than 5 l/min then 
the boundary of the mechanism is not clear-cut by any means. We could understand 
the mechanism as being comprised of the heart, the arteries, and veins and explain 
the phenomenon by alluding to the heart rate. Alternatively, we could include the 
complete regulatory system of the heart, i.e. baroreceptors, the vasomotor regulatory 
center in the hypothalamus, etc.. Wiggling the baroreceptor (bottom-up) would 
change the heartbeat and the blood delivery and running (top-down) would change 
the state of the baroreceptor. Therefore, the baroreceptor fulfills the MM criteria. As 
we can see delimiting the time and precision boundaries of a mechanism involves an 
additional pragmatic decision. Omitting or including (earlier) causes, most virulent in 
etiological mechanisms, where there is no natural starting point, but also in 
constitutive ones (like the cyclical mechanism for blood delivery), is not determined 
by the explanandum phenomenon and MM. 
Third, specification of the degree of precision for the description of the 
mechanism is also not settled by MM. A mechanism can explain how something 
works in broad strokes, or it can be very precise. There are different virtues and 
drawbacks in different circumstances. If, for example, we want to explain how the 
mechanism for action potentials is the same in all living organisms, we would have to 
tell the story in quite general terms, invoking comparatively vague causal interactions 
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and entities (such as sodium and potassium channels, the membrane, ions, 
depolarization, hyperpolarization, etc., as we find it explained in textbooks). However, 
sometimes we are more interested in telling how action potentials behave in a very 
precise manner (e.g. in human Purkinje cells), thus including the specifics of the ion 
channel types‟ distributions and their behavior in an action potential. For example the 
sodium voltage-gated channels Nav1.1, Nav1.6, Nabeta1 and Nabeta2 in human 
Purkinje cells (Schaller and Caldwell 2003, 2), an overview of this diversity can be 
found in the 800 page book by Bertil Hille (2001). There is often a trade-off between 
the precision of the description of the mechanism and the scope of the phenomenon 
that can be explained by a mechanism, but this is not always the case. In stark 
contrast to some parts of physics and chemistry, in biology generality usually requires 
omitting the details produced by the ubiquitous diversity of living things. Thus, while 
the exact description of a single chemical reaction, (e.g. 2H++O2-H2O) will not have 
to be less precise in order to be applicable to myriads of other instances, biological 
explanations often have decrease in precision in order to encompass more instances, 
a fortiori more instances of different taxa. Mechanism types whose scope is larger 
than one organism at one time will mostly describe mechanism tokens that have a 
family resemblance. They are similar in the aspects described, but dissimilar in 
others. There is, however, no objective way of deciding where one family of 
mechanisms stops and another begins. Moreover, in even only slightly different 
explanatory contexts the same organisms could be tokens of different types. 
Finally, failing on the very aim it was constructed to accomplish, the distinction 
between a mechanism and its background conditions cannot always be settled on 
the grounds of the mutual manipulability criteria. Even in Craver‟s own example, the 
case of brain areas performing a certain task, both using fMRIs (top-down) and 
manipulating with these areas (bottom-up) will not exclude the background condition 
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of blood flow in these areas from the mechanism. Craver writes that “mere correlates 
of task performance [blood flow] cannot be manipulated to change task performance” 
(Craver 2007, 159). Although he is right in stating that often manipulating background 
conditions “tend to be non-specific” (2007, 158), like in the case of the heart pumping 
blood and some performed task by the brain, this does not have to be the case. In an 
ideal intervention, we could throttle the blood flow in a very restricted area of the 
brain so that it would change task performance very subtly.13 Fine-grained 
intervention on perceived background conditions are indistinguishable from the parts 
we want to include in a mechanism. Our decision to exclude blood flow from the 
mechanism stems rather from more general ideas about the kinds of causal 
interactions we want in our explanation. It is not the case that blood flow plays no 
causal role, but that typically it does not play an interesting role in the context of 
neurobiology. Neurobiological explanations typically omit the parts that concern the 
                                                 
13 The idea of such an intervention is not to block the blood flow that normally surges 
after the neuronal activity but to cut off the oxygen and glucose supply ahead of time 
so that the neurons will not be able to perform properly. Arguing that the top-down 
condition will only change the surge after the activity, so MM excludes the blood flow 
surge, as the bottom-up intervention and the detected changes are distinct, is futile: 
of course no backward causation can take place, and a prolonged ideal intervention 
into the blood flow (with repeated task performance) will render it in accordance with 
MM. (Recent findings (Sirotin and Das 2009) even suggest that blood is sent in 
anticipation of neural events that never take place which could even suggest that a 
very rapid replenishment is crucial even for short periods of neuronal activity). 
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energy delivery (whether it is blood flow, mitochondria activity, etc.), as they are not 
salient. 14 
All these points show that a satisfactory solution for PMERP is only attainable 
by combining the manipulability criterion with several pragmatic decisions. We are 
now in position to put together the ontic and pragmatic parts of the relevance relation 
for a mechanism. 
 
6. The pragmatic-ontic approach to mechanisms 
 
According to van Fraassen, any why-question consists of a triple Q = {Pk, X, 
R}, where Pk is the topic of the question, X = {P1, …, Pk,…} is the contrast class, i.e., 
a set of statements that includes the topic plus a set of other propositions that are 
false, and R is a relevance relation. The answer to a question is a proposition A that 
is relevant to Q. This means that A bears the relation R to the couple <Pk, X>. 
Therefore, the question „Why Pk?‟ presupposes that Pk is true and that all the other 
elements in X are false. Furthermore, question Pk is asking for a certain kind of 
answer, namely an answer that bears relation R (to the couple < Pk, X>) (cf. (Van 
Fraassen 1988))15. A well-known criticism of van Fraassen‟s account is that he does 
                                                 
14 An interdisciplinary community that is interested exactly in these kinds of questions 
is however organized in the International Society for Cerebral Blood Flow & 
Metabolism. 
15 I believe that following the Van Frassen construction of pragmatics of explanation 
and adding the determinants to his relevance relation is the most straightforward 
method. However, it could be that an explication of the same points in a more 
elaborate framework of erotetic logic is possible. For example Hintikka & Halonen 
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not give any further specification of R, which turns it into an „anything goes‟ position 
(Kitcher and Salmon 1987). This is, however, not implied (as Kitcher has already 
subsequently acknowledged (Kitcher 2001, 76, fn. 6). While van Fraassen does not 
say much about the relevance relation, my goal here is precisely to explicate the 
relevance relation for mechanistic questions. The necessary supplementations are 
determining factors for R. These determining factors are only applicable context-
dependently, but are in no way random, loose, or arbitrary. First, there is the ontic, 
causal-manipulative part of the relevance condition. The terms that appear in a 
mechanism description are entities and their causal interactions. (This excludes for 
example statistical explanations as in population genetics or structural explanation as 
in unifying electricity and magnetism in Maxwell‟s equations). The entities and the 
causal interactions appearing in the answer have to change the explanandum 
behavior if manipulated (as defined in CR1, CR1a, and CR1b). This ensures that 
there is a causal efficacy of these entities and causal interactions for the 
explanandum. Second, there is a pragmatic part of the relevance condition. Lexical 
(or level(s)), temporal, and precision constraints must be added to the ontic-
manipulative condition in order for the boundaries of the mechanism to be 
determined. All of these conditions should then select a unique set of entities and 
causal interactions that brings about the explanandum behavior. One arrives at a 
level of precision sufficient to meet the explanatory relevance problem only if one 
includes both the ontic-manipulative as well as the pragmatic conditions. As the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2005) „Interrogative-Nomological Method‟ would exchange contract classes with 
„queried constants‟ (2005, 32-35) , and the determinants would be general properties 
of the background theory used. However as their method is based on laws and 
deduction, it does not fit the account developed here.  
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descriptions of mechanisms are answers to questions, pragmatic salience conditions 
are part of their determining factors. These are the conditions that distinguish ideal 
explanatory texts, which in principle would explain phenomena in a causal-
mechanical way, from descriptions of mechanisms that are partial explanatory 
information.  
We finally arrive at the following characterization of mechanistic explanation: 
Mechanistic explanations are answers to questions determined by the triple 
determinants of the question Q = {Pk, X, R}, and the quadruple determinants of the 
relevance relation R = {L, P, T, M}; where Pk stands for the topic (including the 
scope) of the question; X for the contrast class; R for the relevance relation; L for the 
level(s) or lexicon of the descriptive concepts;16 P for the precision or the tendency of 
precision of the explanation (e.g. as detailed as possible, as general as possible); T 
for the time-frame and time resolution of the explanans (starting and end points, 
changes should be accounted for in a seconds-, milliseconds-, or nanoseconds-
scale); and finally M, the mechanistic relation, which stays the same in all 
                                                 
16 As many before me have realized, talk of „levels‟ is notoriously problematic (see 
e.g. (Machamer and Sullivan 2003)), therefore I would suggest to call this 
determinant the lexicon, a set of (often interconnected) concepts used in (a) certain 
discipline(s) at a certain time to explain phenomena of a certain domain. However, I 
would like the determinant L not only to determine to what paradigm or general 
theory a certain explanation belongs, but a more narrow lexical sub-structure e.g. 
organs, cells, molecules , sodium channels, Kv1.1-Kv1.8, etc.  
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mechanistic explanation.17 What makes these explanations explicitly mechanistic 
explanations is two-fold: first, the explanation has to be more fine-grained than the 
description of the explanandum, and second it has to involve entities and direct 
causal interactions, i.e. it has to include several entities that interact directly with each 
other, and if manipulated, change the explanandum phenomenon. These are the 
cornerstones of mechanistic explanation. If no entities and interactions are involved 
in the description (but for example only differential equations),  then there is no 
mechanism.18 If the interactions of the entities are not direct (in Woodward‟s sense of 
direct causal interactions), then we would claim that this is not a complete 
mechanism, but only a mechanism sketch (see (Darden 2005, 361); and if wiggling 
the entities (according to CR1, CR1a and CR1b) would not change the explanandum 
phenomenon, then we would claim that this entity is not relevant. As I will show 
below, although these determinants are not independent of each other, i.e. a decision 
on one determinant restricts choices on other determinants), there are still enough 
                                                 
17 M is the same for all mechanistic explanations but can be varied if other kinds of 
explanation are sought. In [self-reference removed for blind review], we sketch a 
more general approach that includes different kinds of explanations. 
18 Of course, differential equations can sometimes be interpreted mechanistically, as 
for example in the case of the Hodgkin-Huxley equations, but only supplemented with 
such an interpretation, it amounts to a mechanistic explanation. (However, a causal 
interpretation of the Hodgkin-Huxley equations may not amount to a mechanistic one, 
see (Weber 2008), (Craver 2008) and (Bogen 2008) for a debate on this very topic). 
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degrees of freedom to each of them, so that it is not the case that deciding on one 
implies a decision on another.19 
                                                 
19 A recently published account of functional explanation in context (Couch 2009) 
bears interesting similarities to the approach presented here. Comparing the two, 
however, reveals some problems with Couch‟s interesting construction. His account 
of functional explanation attempts to combine a pragmatic approach to the 
description of functional kinds with a variant of Mackie‟s inus condition for the 
realizing structure of that function. However, Couch does not supply a tool for making 
the explanandum function F precise. The scope and contrast class of the explananda 
deliver exactly this. Moreover, his use of Mackie‟s inus conditions imports a 
characteristic of this account that is in conflict with a pragmatic approach. Inus 
conditions do not distinguish between background conditions and active or salient 
parts. (As the generic example goes, the short circuit, oxygen, and the lack of a 
sprinkler are all factors in one inus condition for burning the house down). Thus, 
being „context sensitive‟, as Couch suggests, in the definition of the explanandum 
kind F does not suffice in order to exclude any background from the explanation. 
Accordingly, in his example, the „capacity of the human structure S for „light 
reception‟ F‟, he claims that the inus set is complete with the receptor and the visual 
pigment, and “[t]his is not to deny that the other components may be relevant to 
certain aspects of the functioning of the eye; but in giving the explanation we should 
see that the other components can be ignored” (2009, 256). His example of an 
irrelevant component, the iris, seems convincing as it is indeed not directly relevant, 
but take the clarity of the lens: a severe cataract can lead to the loss of the capacity 
of light reception, so isn‟t an at least minimally transparent lens a necessary 
condition? Moreover, dead receptor cells do not have this capacity either, so blood, 
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7. Example: The Mechanism of Transcription 
Taking into account the pragmatic concerns discussed in the previous 
sections, it is obvious that calling a mechanism the “mechanism of transcription” is so 
vague that it is not a real candidate for a mechanistic explanation. However, before 
turning to further specifications, it is worth mentioning that it is possible to call a 
similar mechanism the „mechanism for RNA synthesis‟. Nota bene, both names are 
extremely vague and could also mean different processes (e.g. RNA synthesis in 
vitro vs. in vivo DNA transcription), however, the interesting point here is that it is 
possible to convert some constitutional mechanistic explanations into etiological 
explanations and vice versa: RNA synthesis is about the mechanism leading up to an 
RNA molecule and transcription is about the mechanism underlying this 
phenomenon. Although this is not universally the case, at least if we do not want to 
have very contrived formulations of the explanandum, it does point to a first decision 
about the explanandum and therefore the explanation sought: constitutional vs. 
etiological explanation. Although this decision has the consequence that the further 
determinants of the relevance relation are to be formulated differently and therefore 
the criteria for inclusion will be expressed differently, in some cases, the entities and 
causal interactions that will appear in the explanation could be the same for both 
constitutive and etiological explanations.  
The second decision to be made is the scope of the explanandum (or of the 
topic Pk). Do we want to take into account all living cells, just eukaryotes, just those of 
the black rat (rattus rattus), etc.? If we do want the scope to be as general as 
                                                                                                                                                        
oxygen, and nutrient supply to the eye is also necessary, etc.. Only pragmatic 
constraints on the explanans sought, like Lexicon, Time, and Precision, could 
exclude these conditions. Mackie‟s ideal account cannot serve to resolve this issue. 
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possible, this will impose certain restrictions about the possible details that could be 
involved (as discussed in the third point of Section Five). This is an important point as 
we can now see that to some extent the scope of Pk is already restricting the choices 
for other determinants, precision and time resolution. If we want to tell a story about 
all cells, we have to stay coarse-grained on the kind of entities, causal interactions 
and time resolution we seek. As I mentioned above, the precision and time 
constraints are not fixed by the choice of scope, they are only restricted by it. Two 
examples of explanation of transcription in different standard textbooks of biology can 
illustrate this. For example, here is the most concise one in (Lodish 2000, glossary) 
“Process whereby one strand of a DNA molecule is used as a template for synthesis 
of a complementary RNA by RNA polymerase”. Here is one with a little more detail: 
Transcription begins with the opening and unwinding of a small portion 
of the DNA double helix to expose the bases on each DNA strand. One 
of the two strands of the DNA double helix then acts as a template for 
the synthesis of an RNA molecule. As in DNA replication, the nucleotide 
sequence of the RNA chain is determined by the complementary base-
pairing between incoming nucleotides and the DNA template. When a 
good match is made, the incoming ribonucleotide is covalently linked to 
the growing RNA chain in an enzymatically catalyzed reaction.[…] 
The enzymes that perform transcription are called RNA polymerases. 
Like the DNA polymerase that catalyzes DNA replication, RNA 
polymerases catalyze the formation of the phosphodiester bonds that 
link the nucleotides together to form a linear chain. The RNA 
polymerase moves stepwise along the DNA, unwinding the DNA helix 
just ahead of the active site for polymerization to expose a new region of 
the template strand for complementary base-pairing. In this way, the 
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Figure 1: The RNA 
Polymerase II in yeast in 
a 16Å resolution (Darst et 
al. 1991, better quality 
image courtesy of Seth 
Darst) 
 
growing RNA chain is extended by one nucleotide at a time in the 5′-to-
3′ direction. The substrates are nucleoside triphosphates (ATP, CTP, 
UTP, and GTP); (Alberts et al. 1994, 241ff.). 
 
As we can see, even if we want to describe the mechanism responsible for 
most of transcription (excluding e.g. reverse transcription), the picture can be more or 
less detailed. Additionally, the time frame we are interested in could be all of the 
process or just the beginning, i.e. the initiation process or another part of the 
mechanism. 
Decision on the Contrast class focuses the explanation on different aspects of 
the process. We could ask when the transcription is successful, in the sense of 
accurate rather than inaccurate nucleotide sequence (according to usual 
complementary base pairing), which leads to a more detailed description of the 
proofreading part of transcription (not mentioned in the basic textbook description). 
We could ask for success in the sense of a specific mRNA to be transcripted, which 
would lead to a more detailed picture of the initiation process including upstream 
DNA enhancers and promoters, and the RNA Polymerase II complex (extending the 
spatial focus of the general explanans).  
To exemplify the distinction between the 
precision of the description and the included lexicon 
consider the resolution of a protein attained by 
crystallography (usually measured in Ångström). This 
kind of precision is not a matter of levels. While lower 
resolutions might suffice for certain explanations, (e.g. 
the assembly of sub-units, or the location of co-factors) 
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others may require higher ones. As shown in figure 1, seeing the protein helps us 
understand the phenomenon as it allows us to make inferences about the working 
principles and interaction sites of the polymerase with the DNA strand (darker spots). 
Thus, the form of the protein is a relevant feature of the mechanism, too. It allows for 
the localization of different regions of the protein, which if intervened upon, would 
lead to different effects. Further experiments, like amino acid substitutions, exploit 
this kind of knowledge (see (Dieci et al. 1995) for this kind of research based partially 
on (Darst et al. 1991)). 
This leads us to a final point: the level(s) or lexicon used in the explanation. 
We could decide to explain the phenomenon by alluding only to whole molecules, to 
structural features of molecules (like alpha helices and beta sheets), to sub-molecular 
parts (like amino acids), or even to single atoms and their causal interactions. This 
will mainly depend on the methods we use to elucidate the mechanism (see [self-
reference removed for blind review]). However, one does not have to assume that the 
finer-grained entities are mechanisms that bring about the upper level entity. 
Continuing with the example above, the amino acid at a certain interaction site does 
not have to be part of a fully-fledged mechanistic explanation of the polymerase 
activity. It is sufficient that the amino acid residue in question is doing some causal 
work in the overall mechanism of transcription in order for it to be granted 
membership in the mechanism. As we can see, the resulting picture seems far more 
complex and messy than Craver‟s Matryoshka nesting dolls view, which proposes a 
more tidy „levels of mechanism view‟ of mechanisms inside of mechanisms, inside of 
mechanisms (see (Craver 2007, ch. 5-7), and (Craver and Darden, 2001, 118). 
However, the biological literature suggests that biologists are quite opportunistic in 
their selection of entities (or lexica) in a mechanism. On the other hand, if one looks 
at heuristics in science (as some of Darden‟s work has shown), one can follow a 
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string of questions that follow hierarchical patterns (see [removed for blind review] for 
further elaboration of this point). 
To sum up, decisions on the five determinants of a mechanistic explanation 
(Pk, X, L, P, T) (presupposing the mechanistic relation M that makes the explanation 
mechanistic and R being determined by the quadruple) are made on pragmatic 
grounds, and only once they are fixed are the entities and „activities‟ fixed as well. 
Thus, a mechanism should be understood as the set of the referents of the concepts 
used in an explanation. Mechanisms are not “acting entities” in any sense similar to a 
moving atom or an exploding building. To think that mechanisms are „things‟ that 
have some kind of natural existence, akin to natural kinds, is a mistake. What exists, 
if at all, are the entities and their causal interactions.  
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